The Commercial Surge of Catalonia

Stephen P. Bensch
Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania

In reflecting upon the anniversary of the birth of Jaume I from the perspective of commercial development, one cannot help but to consider not only the designs of the great king himself but also the first Congrés d'Història de la Corona d'Aragó held in his honor a century ago. A quick look at the index to the two substantial volumes that contain its proceedings leads to a quick conclusion: virtually nothing relates directly to the theme of commerce. The participants of that learned assembly sought to honor a distant king, but even more importantly they wished to celebrate the Renaixement and establish its connection to the medieval past. "L'avenç social del Principat de Catalunya en lo segle xiii", declared Carreras i Candi, "es de tot naturalesa y pren tanta irradiació, que be-s pot dir que no hi ha en ell cap entitat, institució o organisme, que no hi evolucioni de manera marcadíssima."[1] The topics chosen by the erudite participants emphasized the collaboration of various sectors of Catalan society, particularly nobles, with the king, who provided the fundamental order to expand and consolidate Catalan institutions and culture. The general importance of commerce and exchange was noted, but they formed a distant backdrop to highlight the silhouettes of the king, his leading men, and the most distinctive cultural figures of the reign. Only F. Bofarull i Sans devoted a short section to commerce in his foundational article on the Jews of Catalonia, "la raza judaica" in the language of the time, but even there he had very little to say about economic or commercial activities other than to present royal legislation fixing the rate of interest. In calling attention to the role of Jews in credit and commerce, he referred only to Antonio de Capmany, from whom he cited several erroneous opinions, as we know today, about Jewish banking and migration.[2]

Only in the mid-twentieth century did work on commerce move beyond the state of knowledge at the time of Capmany. André E. Sayous extended an invitation for further study in the early 1930s by examining thirteenth-century business contracts in Barcelona's cathedral in order to trace the emergence of commercial instruments and techniques, the key to commercial development in his eyes, but the Civil War interrupted further explorations of the approach he advocated.[3] A generation later, for-

1. F. Carreras i Candi, "Desenrotllament de la institució notarial a Catalunya en lo segle xiii", in *Congrés d'Història de la Corona d'Aragó* (Barcelona, 1913), ii, p. 751.

2. F. de Bofarull i Sans, "Jaime I y los judíos", in *Congrés d'Història de la Corona d'Aragó* (Barcelona, 1913), ii, pp. 851-53.

3. See the helpful Catalan translation of these fundamental articles with extensive commentary, A. E. Sayous, *Els mètodes comercials a la Barcelona medieval*, tr. A. Garcia i Sanz and G. Feliu Montfort (Barcelona, 1975).

eign scholars returned to the path opened by Sayous, yet the extensive research of Claude Carrère, Charles-Emmanuel Dufourcq, and Mario del Treppo relied heavily on the rich notarial registers of both the Crown and Barcelona for the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.[4] The thirteenth century remained an orphan, for Barcelona lacked the sources (or, more precisely, they were not readily accessible at the time) needed to create a satisfying serial history before 1300, and historians remained almost uniquely fixated on the long-distance exchange of the Catalan capital. Jaume Vicens Vives had raised a series of problems about the initial impulse of early Catalan commercial expansion, yet his speculations tended to become fixed upon a rigid dichotomy between royal and mercantile interests, famously expressed in his contrast between the "ruta de las especias" and the "ruta de las islas."[5] In part, this contrast came about from the richness of narrative chronicles and the earliest royal registers, so explicit about dynastic designs, and the poverty of studies of Barcelona's local documentation that directly addressed economic matters. This approach has led some to doubt whether Barcelona created a true "mercantile class."[6] With the organization of the rich parchment collection in Barcelona's cathedral archives, the nature of commercial techniques, the extension of trading networks, and the formation of the patriciate have become far clearer in the past generation through the publications of Arcadi Garcia Sanz, Carme Batlle Gallart, A. Riera Melis, Gaspar Feliu Montfort, José E. Ruiz Doménec, myself, and the many others cited frequently in the following notes. The commercial development of smaller towns, however, has not yet received as much attention despite the pioneering work on Perpinyà's thirteenth-century notarial material by Richard W. Emery fifty years ago.[7] The central decades of the thirteenth century that concern us here still have not received a distinctive stamp. The commercial thrust so apparent under Jaume I either seems a natural, unproblematic extension of a slowly maturing regional economy in the eleventh and twelfth century, an approach I pursued in my early work on Barcelona, or a poorly documented predecessor to the far-flung commercial networks of the fourteenth and fifteenth century. Here I would like to attempt to contextualize the reign not simply as a transition but as a critical period for the integration of previously distinct Catalan commercial spheres.

Directions of Trade

Two great political events bracket Jaume's reign: the collapse of the dynasty's ambitions in Occitania on the battlefield of Muret and the association of separate realms within the Crown, namely, an independent kingdom of Majorca and, soon thereafter, the kingdom of Sicily. The dynastic and military projection in each case was associated with quite different patterns of commerce, the first anchored on the coastal trunk route, the second on far-flung Mediterranean connections. In the late eleventh and twelfth century, Catalan merchants appear as a collective noun in a number of privileges and *mercator* is occasionally attached to a name, but little of substance can be said about the activities

4. C. Carrère, *Barcelone, centre économique à l'époque des difficultés 1380-1472* (Paris and The Hague, 1967), 2 vols.; C.-E. Dufourcq, *L'Espagne catalane et le Maghrib aux XIII^e^ et XIV^e^ siècles de la bataille de Las Navas de Tolosa à l'évenement du sultan mérinide Abou-l-Hasan (1331)* (Paris, 1966); M. del Treppo, *I mercanti catalani e l'espansione della Corona d'Aragona nel secolo XV* (Naples, 1972).

5. See especially J. Vicens Vives, "La economía de los países de la Corona de Aragón en la baja edad media", in *VI Congreso de Historia de la Corona de Aragón* (Madrid, 1959), pp. 103-35, and the comments of J. E. Ruiz Doménec, "Ruta de las especias/Ruta de las islas. Apuntes para una nueva periodización", *Anuario de Estudios Medievales*, 10 (1980), pp. 689-97.

6. J. E. Ruiz Doménec, "Iluminaciones sobre el pasado de Barcelona", in *En las costas del Mediterráneo occidental*, ed. D. Abulafia and B. Gari (Barcelona, 1996), pp. 72-73 contains a brief reflection on much earlier work on the theme.

7. R. W. Emery, *The Jews of Perpignan in the thirteenth century: An economic study based on notarial records* (New York, 1959).

of individual traders.[8] Before the late twelfth century, Catalan long-distance commerce appears essentially passive. Local merchants certainly participated in a generalized trade of grain, wine, oil, hides, and slaves, but there was as yet little distinctive about Catalan products and Catalan merchants had not yet carved out distinctive markets in distant locations. Their presence outside Catalonia has left only the faintest trace; a rare glimpse of Catalans selling slaves in Genoa in 1127 need not be interpreted as an indication of intense commercial exchange. A strong connection did, however, exist between the Catalan coast and Occitania, a critical stimulus to early commercial development, for the more vibrant towns of Languedoc and Provence helped transfer business techniques and brought substantial capital to the Catalans. A number of immigrants from Occitania can be identified in Barcelona during the 1140s, some of whom maintained continuing commercial contacts with their original homes; this contact proved critical in diffusing the sophisticated business forms of Occitania to the Catalans.[9]

Montpellier had a particularly important role to play in promoting Catalan commerce, even though its role in the Crown of Aragon has been surprisingly marginalized in most accounts. Because its distance from the Principate and its peculiar legal status may make it appear an exotic appendage to the Crown, it nevertheless provided access to the critical corridor that linked the Western Mediterranean through the fairs of Champagne to the woolens of the Low Countries, Northern France, and even England. Montpellier had already established its economic importance by 1200. While developing some local cloth production and, above all, an important dyeing industry, the city had grown wealthy as an outlet for the woolens of Northern France and through the financial sophistication required to manage such far-flung affairs.[10] We are fortunate to have an early glimpse of a prominent Montpellier businessman, Guilhem Atbrand, who evidently died unexpectedly while travelling overland from Montpellier just beyond El Pertús in 1184 and left his testament in Catalonia. This wealthy banker left 3,200 *solidi* of Melgueil and 300 silver marks for pious bequests, provided 4,000 *solidi* of Melgueil to his son, and left the main source of his wealth, three banking tables (*tabulae cambiarum*) in Montpellier, to his heirs.[11] A fortune on this scale compares to that of a Catalan baron of the time and far surpasses what one could expect from a contemporary *prohom* of Barcelona. The testament of Saxio, surely an Occitan merchant settled in Barcelona, provides a revealing comparison, for he died shortly before Guilhem Atbrand. Saxio was a dynamic trader who stockpiled fine cloth, incense, leather hides, 146 gold morabatins, 15 lbs. of silver coin, and 90 half marcs of silver in his Barcelona residence; most revealing, however, is the house he left in Montpellier to two kinsmen.[12] Two critical forms of commercial association appear in his testament for the first time in Catalonia: a commercial partnership (*societas*) and shares in a jointly owned ship.

When the child-king Jaume ascended the throne in 1213, he found the older commercial axis along the coast in place and becoming more active. The king's native city, Montpellier, anchored Catalan commerce along the Mediterranean and became even more critical for Catalan trade during his reign because of the intensifying cloth trade with the Champagne fairs, which were reaching their

8. S. P. Bensch, *Barcelona and its rulers, 1096*-1291 (Barcelona, 1995), pp. 220-31 [*Barcelona i els seus dirigents, 1096-1291*, trans. M. Lluïsa Parés (Barcelona, 2000), pp. 200-10].

9. Bensch, *Barcelona*, pp. 228-9 [trad. cat. pp. 206-7]; P. Banks, "Alguns immigrants del Llenguadoc a la Barcelona del segle xii", in *Miscel·lània d'homenatge a Enric Moreu-Rey* (Barcelona, 1989), pp. 153-72.

10. K. L. Reyerson, "Le rôle de Montpellier dans le commerce des draps de laine avant 1350", *Annales du Midi*, 94 (1982), pp. 17-40 [repr. in *Society, law, and trade in medieval Montpellier* (Aldershot, 1995)].

11. Arxiu Diocesà de Girona [ADG], Sant Feliu de Cadins, perg. 15.

12. Bensch, *Barcelona*, p. 229 and ap. 3 [trad. cat. p. 207].

apogee in the 1250s.[13] Although the bishop of Montpellier in 1255 made clear that Jaume held the city as lord but not king, "non ut rex sed ut dominus Montispessulani", Jaume never acknowledged the overlordship of the French king and felt no limitation in his prerogatives to oversee and profit from the city's vibrant commercial life.[14] Merchants from the principal Catalan trading centers arranged to acquire valuable northern woolens, which first appear in Catalonia around 1200.[15] Following the path of Occitan merchants with whom they had long been associated, Catalans also made their way to the Champagne fairs. In 1259 merchants of finished leather and goat skins (*cordovani*) from Lleida received a royal privilege to appoint a consul at the fairs, just as hide merchants from Barcelona, Valencia, and Montpellier each possessed, in order to partition the stalls in the merchant lodge they shared.[16] Leather and hides, traditional exports of the Catalan economy rather than locally produced textiles, thus appear to be critical items to exchange for the expensive northern woolens, and merchants from Montpellier were closely involved with the Catalans. Further confirmation of this trade has survived in two rare documents, both from 1261: a letter of change drawn up at Barcelona and payable at the fair of Provins between a tanner (*blancherius*) of Barcelona and a merchant of Saint-Antonin in Rouergue, Joan Veyera, a cloth exporter active in Barcelona for at least a decade, and a large loan contracted at Montpellier between merchants of Barcelona in pounds Tournois and payable at the fair of Provins.[17] Although Catalan merchants were beginning to penetrate directly into the main circuits of the northern cloth trade in the wake of the Occitans, it appears that Montpellier remained the key point of distribution to the Mediterranean. Catalan cloth-merchants, *draparii*, kept houses for their business there, and several comanda contracts specify Montpellier as their destination.[18] To promote the efficient operation of the extensive business activities of his Catalan subjects in Occitania, in 1269 King Jaume granted merchants of Barcelona and Lleida the right to select a representative (*rector*) to supervise the affairs of Catalan merchants in Montpellier.[19] Montpellier merchants themselves, however, do not appear to have travelled extensively to Catalonia; in their stead, merchants from Saint-Antonin served as important exporters from Montpellier, particularly in the eastern Pyrenees.[20] By intensifying the traditional trading patterns with Occitania and linking Catalan commerce to the cloth centers in the north, Montpellier formed an integral part of the Crown of Aragon and kept the wheels of commerce turning in Catalonia itself.

13. J. Combes, "Montpellier et les foires de Champagne", *France du Nord et France du Midi. Contactes et influences réciproques. Actes du 96e Congrès National des Sociétés Savantes* (Paris, 1978), pp. 381-87.

14. Cited in D. Abulafia, "The problem of the Kingdom of Majorca (1229/1276-1343)", *Mediterranean historical review*, 5 (1990), pp. 160-61.

15. Bensch, *Barcelona*, pp. 229-31 [trad. cat. pp. 208-9].

16. A. de Capmany y de Montpalau, *Memorias históricas sobre la marina, comercio y artes de la antigua ciudad de Barcelona* (2nd ed., Barcelona, 1962), II, no. 15.

17. M. T. Ferrer i Mallol, "Nous documents sobre els catalans a les fires de la Xampanya", in *Jaime I y su epoca. X Congreso de Historia de la Corona de Aragón* (Zaragoza, 1982), II, pp. 151-59. Joan de Verayre and Raymon de Berenchs of Saint-Antonin were already involved in a loan to a Barcelona cloth merchant, Ramon Oliver, in 1251, Arxiu Capitular de Barcelona [ACB] 4-51-718.

18. C. Batlle, "Relaciones de Barcelona con Occitania en el siglo XIII", in *Montpellier, la couronne d'Aragon et les pays de langue d'oc. Actes de XIIe congrès d'histoire de la couronne d'Aragon* (Montpellier, 1988), II, 17-20; Bensch, *Barcelona*, pp. 299-300 [trad. cat. pp. 273-74].

19. Arxiu de la Corona d'Aragó [ACA], Cancelleria, reg. 15, fol. 140*r* [1 iii 1269].

20. R. W. Emery, "Flemish cloth and Flemish merchants in Perpignan in the thirteenth century", in *Essays in medieval life and thought presented in honor of Austin Patterson Evans*, eds. J. H. Mundy, R. W. Emery and B. N. Nelson (New York, 1955), p. 157; J. Combes, "Une famille de négociants quercynols à Montpellier et à Marseille au XIIIe siècle", *XXVIIe congrès de la fédération historique du Languedoc-Roussillon* (Perpignan, 1953), pp. 1-8.

Other centers in Occitania also provided cloth for the Catalan market. In addition to the high quality cloth from the Champagne fairs, woolens of medium quality, particularly undyed pieces of Narbonne and those manufactured at Montoliu near Carcassonne, sometimes dyed blue, made their way into the eastern Pyrenees and Barcelona from Occitania. Traffic in medium quality cloth, however, was distributed through more diffuse networks than those involving cloth from Champagne, for Occitan merchants both brought their own local products to the Principate and Catalan merchants travelled to acquire them at their source as well.[21] Further afield Marseilles and Genoa also on occasion attracted Catalan merchants travelling beyond the Rhône, but these potential competitors, anxious to exert their economic interests along the Provençal coast, were not always welcoming. During Jaume's reign, Marseilles, an established port with wide connections, appears as a destination but once among the numerous commercial contracts from Barcelona. In the spring and summer of 1248, Giraud Amalric recorded 115 ships at harbor in Marseilles, of which one made Barcelona its destination and four others, all *barchae*, the preferred vessel for *cabotage*, were bound for Catalonia.[22] Another *barca* anchored in port belonged to a man from Torroella, probably Torroella de Montgrí in the county of Empúries. Its highly independent count, Hug IV, had entered into a treaty with the rectors of Marseilles in 1219, which guaranteed his subjects the right to make port freely at Marseilles, set up tables for business, take on pilgrims, and sail to Alexandria, Bougie, or Ceuta. In exchange, the count granted citizens of Marseilles the privilege of importing grain from Empúries, except in times of famine, and advantageous tolls.[23] This seems to have created a closer connection to Empúries than to other parts of Catalonia, for Marseilles did not necessarily welcome Catalan competition at home.[24] Similarly Genoa, despite its early involvement with the counts of Barcelona in several naval campaigns, had become a suspicious rival. Very few Genoese contracts cited Catalan ports as their destination in the first half of the thirteenth century, and the Catalan sources have little to say about direct exchange with the Ligurian republic.[25] By 1250, however, Genoese contracts indicate a renewed although limited direct exchange with Catalonia, yet more symptomatically Catalan and Genoese investors, merchants, and seamen intersected in dense, complex and far-flung webs of shipping and exchange. By 1260, a triangular trade was already being traced out in which an investor in Barcelona, Guillem de Peralada, financed the shipment of grain from Sicily to Genoa on a vessel of Marseilles.[26] The complex linkage of shipping after 1250 can also be seen in the contract made in 1263 by two

21. C. Rendu, "Un aperçu de l'économie cerdane à la fin du XIII[ème] siècle: Draps, bétails et céréales sur le marché de Puigcerdà en 1280-1281", *Ceretania*, 1 (1991), pp. 85-106; A. Riera Melis, "Perpiñán, 1025-1285. Crecimiento económico, diversificación social y expansión urbana", in *En las costas del Mediterráneo occidental*, eds. D. Abulafia and B. Gari (Barcelona, 1996), pp. 18-19; AHG Ca fol. 80*r* [27 iii 1265], 81*r* [28 iii 1265], 82*r* [29 iii 1265].

22. *Assegurances i canvis marítims medievals a Barcelona*, eds. A. Garcia i Sanz and M. T. Ferrer i Mallol (Barcelona, 1994), II, no. 4; J. H. Pryor, *Business contracts of medieval Provence: Selected* notulae *from the cartulary of Giraud Amalric of Marseilles 1248* (Toronto, 1981), pp. 70-72.

23. V. L. Bourrilly, *Essai sur l'histoire politique de la commune de Marseille, des origines à la victoire de Charles d'Anjou (1264)* (Aix, 1925), pièces justificatives, nos. 21, 21bis.

24. An early comanda contract from Castelló d'Empúries indicated Marseilles as its destination, AHG Ca 206, fol. 111*v* [26 vi 1265], and the widow of a native of Sant Pere Pescador had to appoint a procurator at Marseilles, where her husband was living before his death, Arxiu Històric de Girona [AHG] Ca 156b, fol. 3*v* [18 viii 1262].

25. G. Jehel, *Les gênois en Méditerranée occidentale (fin XI[e]-début XIV[e] siècle)* (Paris, 1993), pp. 332-35; O. R. Constable, "Genoa and Spain in the twelfth and thirteenth century", *Journal of European economic history*, 19 (1990), pp. 635-56; Bensch, *Barcelona*, pp. 287-89 [trad. cat. pp. 262-64].

26. J. P. Cuvillier, "Barcelone, Gênes, et le commerce du blé de Sicile vers le milieu du XIII[e] siècle", in *Atti del I[o] congresso storico Liguria-Catalogna* (Bordighera, 1974), pp. 220-234.

Genoese merchants to rent their ship harbored at Roses to a local merchant in order to transport 600 *saumatas* of salt, no doubt acquired from the salt pans at Castelló d'Empúries, to Genoa.[27] Around the same time, Catalans turned up at Genoa renting ships from local proprietors.[28] As Catalan merchants pressed further into distant Mediterranean markets, the extensive Genoese shipping networks offered substantial advantages to the Catalans, who frequently had to arrange transportation in foreign ports. Significantly, when King Jaume intervened in 1269 by royal decree to promote Catalan exporters in Barcelona, he did so not by limiting access of foreigners to his ports but by requiring merchants at Barcelona to employ Catalan vessels if any were available rather than foreign ships.[29]

Facing stiff competition in Catalonia itself, the Genoese turned to Majorca, the destination of more than ninety-five percent of their commercial contracts involving Iberia during the second half of the thirteenth century.[30] Majorca quickly emerged as a nodal point for Western Mediterranean trade. The conquest of the island not only extended Catalan long-distance trade into an important new market but also transformed its very nature. By linking distinctive commercial zones in Catalonia itself through the dynamic entrepot and transshipment center emerging at Palma, new commercial connections emerged that promoted a complex interface of the separate commercial zones in the Principate, but at a distance from the mainland. While the king could provide the leadership to assemble the combined naval potential of Catalonia and Occitania to undertake the expedition, the merchants who followed in its wake represented not Catalan commerce generally but the potentials of separate regional economic zones. At Majorca, these elements linked up in potent ways and, equally important, combined with the commercial and shipping potential of Italian and Occitan merchants more dynamically than in Catalonia itself. The importance of Occitans in the conquest of Majorca was substantial. The naval contribution from Marseilles, a city with limited commercial ties to Catalonia, may well have exceeded the contingent from Barcelona itself in Jaume's expedition, and Italians, although excluded from the campaign, soon flocked to the island, where the Genoese received significant privileges.[31] Both elements provided substantial amounts of capital, commercial knowledge, and shipping that amplified the new connections forming among Catalan merchants of varied provenance on the island.

Although it is tempting to speak of Catalonia as an integrated, distinctive commercial world, it actually consisted of three commercial zones that were relatively independent from one another in the early thirteenth century.[32] The first zone was centered on the Ebro Valley and the Segre. Catalunya Nova rapidly became an important a supplier of grain, wine, and wool to a number of distant destinations, and Lleida with its *brunetes* as well as Osca to the north manufactured a distinctive type of textile appropriate for export.[33] The integration of local markets on the Ebro and Segre finds elo-

27. AHG Ca 156b, fol. 46*v* [29 vi 1263].

28. Jehel, *Les génois*, p. 279.

29. Capmany, *Memorias históricas*, II, no. 22.

30. Jehel, *Les génois*, pp. 334-35.

31. F. Fernández-Armesto, *Before Columbus. Exploration and colonization from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, 1229-1492* (London, 1987), pp. 21-23; A. Santamaria, "El patrimonio de las comunidades de Marsella y de Montpeller en el repartimiento de Mallorca", in *Montpellier, la couronne d'Aragon et les pays de langue d'oc. Actes de XII^e congrès d'histoire de la couronne d'Aragon* (Montpellier, 1982), I, pp. 105-134.

32. The point, implicitly recognized but rarely articulated in the proliferation of local studies, is succinctly developed by J. A. Sesma Muñoz, "El mundo urbano en la Corona de Aragón", in *El mundo urbano en la Castilla del siglo XIII*, ed. M. J. Jiménez (Seville, 2006), I, pp. 205-7.

33. A. Riera Melis, "Els orígens de la manufactura tèxtil a la Corona catalanoaragonesa (c. 1150-1298)", in *La Mediterrània de la Corona d'Aragó. Segles XIII-XVI. XVIII Congrés d'Història de la Corona d'Aragó* (Valencia, 2005), I, pp. 826-31.

quent expression when Jaume I, possibly referring to Islamic administrative precedents, confirmed the *lleudes* between Tudela and Tortosa in 1252.[34] During Jaume's reign, the Ebro and Segre became important avenues for the export of agricultural products and medium and low quality cloth, yet we are poorly informed about the merchants who controlled the export trade itself. Tortosa and its region were largely in the hands of the Templars, Hospitallers, and the Montcada, and the earliest series of grain export licenses examined to date, namely those from the early fourteenth century, involved officials of the royal court, nobles, and church prelates.[35] Further, the exports were not primarily destined for Catalonia but by the later years of Jaume's reign involved destinations spread out between Genoa and Valencia, with a substantial amount of grain headed to Majorca as well.

The second commercial zone was centered on Barcelona, whose population, wealth, and commercial vitality all grew with relentless pressure in the middle of the thirteenth century and whose commercial dynamism made itself felt in the Vallès and along the neighboring coast. Trade with North Africa, often passing through Palma and thereby gaining momentum, became the backbone of the city's booming commerce under Jaume I. Although the absence of non-royal notarial registers deprives us of the precision we would like, the weight of surviving commercial contracts on parchment, the privileged indicator of long-distance investment, clearly indicates the structuring of Barcelona's trade to the south, from which trade with Sicily, the Levant, and Byzantium formed an appendage that would grow in importance in the late thirteenth and fourteenth century.[36] Maghrib trade relied on a complex mixture of Italian, Occitan, and Catalan capital and shipping available in Majorca, where the classic pattern of the export of northern woolens was extended in order to acquire the characteristic products of the Maghrib: cereal, fruits, hides, wax, and spices arriving from the Levant. A revealing shipping contract arranged in 1256 at Tunis bypassed Catalonia completely, for two Barcelona merchants, Pere Bofill and Pere de Llobregrat, arranged to ship their goods directly from Tunis to Montpellier on a Genoese ship.[37] This route established a primary connection that fueled Maghrib trade but avoided Barcelona itself. With their increasing prosperity from local resources at home, Barcelona's patricians provided the financial backing to structure this critical element in Catalan commercial expansion. Around 1250, North African trade brought in roughly two-thirds of the growing amount collected from commercial tolls due the king at Barcelona.[38]

While Barcelona investors and merchants became the most dynamic element in Maghrib trade and, by the middle of Jaume's reign, even more distant destinations in the Mediterranean, they did not dominate the other two trading zones in the Prinicipate, as has sometimes been casually assumed. Northeastern Catalonia, the third commercial zone, remained largely independent of Barcelona mer-

34. M. Gual Camarena, *Vocabulario del comercio medieval* (Tarragona, 1968), pp. 107-110; J. A. Sesma Muñoz, "La fijación de fronteras económicas entre los estados de la Corona de Aragón", *Aragón en la edad media*, v (1983), pp. 143-44.

35. J. P. Cuvillier, "La noblesse catalane et le commerce des blés aragonais au début du xiv^{e} siècle (1316-1318)", *Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez*, 4 (1970), pp. 113-30; A. J. Sesma Muñoz, "Centros de producción y redes de distribución en los espacios interiores de la Corona de Aragón", in *La Mediterrània de la Corona d'Aragó. Segles xiii-xvi. XVIII Congrés d'Història de la Corona d'Aragó* (Valencia, 2005), i, p. 909-914.

36. Bensch, *Barcelona*, pp. 287-95 [trad. cat. 262-70]; C. E. Dufourcq, "Vers la Méditerranée orientale et l'Afrique", in *Jaime I y su época. X Congreso de Historia de la Corona de Aragón* (Zaragoza, 1982), ii, pp. 7-90; C. Batlle and E. Varela, "Las relaciones comerciales de Barcelona con la Norte de África (siglo xiii)", *Anales de la Universidad de Alicante*, 7 (1987-89), pp. 23-52; D. Abulafia, *A Mediterranean emporium: The Catalan Kingdom of Majorca* (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 103-28, 131-41.

37. ACB 1-6-1303, discussed in Batlle, "Relaciones de Barcelona con Occitania", pp. 15-16.

38. Bensch, *Barcelona*, pp. 293-94 [trad. cat. p. 268]; cf. P. Ortí Gost, *Renda i fisicalitat en una ciutat medieval: Barcelona, segles xii-xiv* (Barcelona, 2000), p. 507.

chants. As a result of new investigations in the rich local sources that compensate for the absence of information about parts of the region in the royal archives, the eastern Pyrenean counties in the past generation have begun to stand out as a distinctive, interconnected economic zone in the thirteenth century. The transformation of Perpinyà under Jaume from a small regional town still in the shadow of the episcopal center at Elna into a thriving center of cloth production and exchange surely represents one of the most dramatic and surprising economic changes in Catalonia during his reign.[39] Perpinyà's prosperity, however, depended not only on the growing resources of Rosselló itself but also on the development of its neighbors, Cerdanya and, to a lesser degree, Empúries. The entire region emerged with a distinctive commercial profile during the thirteenth century. First, the coinage of Melgueil dominated in the coastal counties, creating a strong link to the Occitan economy. Although Jaume I repeatedly sought to legislate the use of the coinage of Barcelona (first the quaternal, then the ternal), this did not stem the rising tide of Melgueil coinage in Rosselló, although Cerdanya did retain its link to the king's money. In the county of Empúries, the coinage of Melgueil had become prevalent by the late twelfth century.[40] A second feature of the eastern Pyrenean region was the importance of the merchants of Saint-Antonin. Emery pointed out their presence at Perpinyà, which they supplied with high quality northern woolens.[41] An examination of the early notarial registers at Puigcerdà and Castelló d'Empúries uncovers a far more extensive network than previously thought.[42] The influence of these merchants from Rouerge grew significantly during Jaume's reign and reached its apogee soon after his death, after which they begin to disappear within a generation. To complement the substantial amount of northern woolens they imported, by the end of Jaume's reign a nascent textile industry, specializing in medium and lower quality cloth aimed primarily at local consumption, was gaining momentum in Puigcerdà, Perpinyà, and Castelló d'Empúries, which joined Lleida as pioneers in Catalan textile production.[43] Although the separation of Rosselló and Cerdanya from the rest of the Principate and their attachment to the new kingdom of Majorca is often presented in terms of an arbitrary dynastic decision by Jaume I in his will, it in fact confirmed a growing economic integration of the region, including the county of Empúries, during his reign.

In terms of commercial contacts, Cotlliure and Roses offered the principal ports for the exports of the merchants of Empúries and Rosselló, and Palma was an important destination.[44] In contrast to the merchants and shippers of Barcelona, however, those of the eastern Pyrenees rarely contracted for longer voyages in their home ports to the Maghrib or even further afield to Sicily or Oltramar.

39. A. Riera Melis, "Perpiñán", pp. 1-61; P. Wolff, "Un grand centre économique et social", *Histoire de Perpignan,* ed. P. Wolff (Paris, 1985), pp. 49-57.

40. Riera Melis, "Perpiñán", pp. 30-31; S. P. Bensch, "Lordship and coinage in Empúries, ca. 1080 - ca. 1140", in *The experience of power in medieval Europe, 950-1350*, eds. A. Kosto, R. F. Berkhofer and A. Cooper (Aldershot, 2005), p. 86.

41. Emery, "Flemish cloth", pp. 156-62.

42. At the feast of Santa Maria of September, 1264, eight merchants of Saint-Antonin were present at Castelló d'Empúries, where they made eight cloth sales totaling 5,396 s. of Melgueil, AHG Ca 206, fols. 16*r-v*, 18*r*, 21*r* [4-5 ix 1264]. Twelve merchants of Saint-Antonin were also present at the March fair at Castelló in 1265, where they made fourteen cloth sales totaling 7,592 s. of Melgueil, AHG Ca 206, fols. 79*v*-81*r* [27-29 iii 1265]. Although documented at Puigcerdà, merchants of Saint-Antonin were not as prominent, for the close connections between Puigcerdà and Perpinyà made the latter the major source of distribution of northern cloth, Rendu, "Un aperçu", pp. 97-99.

43. Riera Melis, "Els orígens", pp. 834-35; S. P. Bensch, "Apprenticeship, wages, and guilds at Puigcerdà (1260-1300)", in *El món urbà a la Corona d'Aragó del 1137 als decrets de Nova Planta. XVII Congrés d'Història de la Corona d'Aragó* (Barcelona, 2003), pp. 210-11. By 1264, guilds of fustian makers and weavers had formed in Castelló d'Empúries, AHG Ca 206, fols. 42*r* [23 xi 1264], 104*v* [26 v 1265].

44. Riera Melis, "Perpiñán", pp. 26-27; AHG Ca 206, fol. 6*r* [30 vii 1264], 102*r* [17 v 1265].

Northeastern Catalonia did, however, provide important contingents for the conquest of Majorca. Ser Carroç, who on the king's appointment became the admiral of Catalonia and Majorca just after the capture of Palma in January, 1230, received in fief the castle of Cadaqués, presumably with its valuable customs duties, from the count of Empúries on the eve of the expedition and held it for a decade for his efforts.[45] Count Hug IV of Empúries himself played a major role in the conquest and thereby secured substantial holdings at Soller and Muró for his dynasty as well as at Palma; his subjects, as well as individuals from Rosselló, formed a particularly large contingent among the Christian immigrants to the island. Strengthened by the dense ties of family, the commercial bonds linking Empúries and Rosselló to Majorca were particularly intense, and from the island entrepot men of the eastern Pyrenees turned in other directions, to the Magrhib, Sicily, and Oltramar.

As a result of the conquest of Majorca and Jaume's policies that turned Palma into an open maritime center, the booming emporium focused the maritime and commercial potential of all three commercial zones of the mainland and allowed them to combine with the capital and shipping provided by the Italians and Occitans in a dynamic new mixture. Under Jaume the most highly-capitalized segment of commerce shifted sharply from the coastal route from Genoa to al-Andalus to a north-south axis that focused the potential of the three relatively independent commercial networks of the mainland on Majorca and then on the Maghrib. While much ink has been spilled on the forces that gave Catalonia its identity, the conquest of Majorca and the reorientation of Catalan commerce under Jaume I forged an integrated commercial network away from the mainland that created a degree of economic interdependence that Catalonia had not possessed before.

Financial Foundations of Directed Trade

As Catalan commercial interests became increasingly focused on a north-south axis, connecting cloth markets of northern Europe with goods from thoughout the Mediterranean funneled to Majorca and the Maghrib, this did not diminish the volume of exchange on the older coastal route, nor did it affect its structure significantly. These two trading routes overlapped, even though their structure, social as well as commercial, differed significantly. Failure to distinguish the two adequately has led to considerable confusion about the pace of development and nature of early Catalan trade. With the clear growth of population, urban and rural, and an increase in agricultural output and small-scale production in the second half of the twelfth century, coastal and regional exchange increased, probably in significant amounts. If one compares Barcelona's earliest customs list from the mid-twelfth century with that of the far better known customs of Mediona in 1222, one cannot but be struck by the rise in the number of products mentioned, particularly the variety of high-end items such as spices and cloth. Yet the arrival of these goods largely occurred through short hops along the coast from Liguria to al-Andalus, or even over inland routes. This traditional movement of *cabotage* was highly individualized, unpredictable, and opportunistic, but its overall impact remained significant even though the people who practiced it have left only fleeting traces in the sources for Barcelona and elsewhere in Catalonia. In Mediterranean commerce generally, small and frequent consis-

45. Archivo Ducal de Medinaceli [ADM], sec. Ampurias, leg. 33, no. 4624 [8 viii 1229]. Ser Carroç subsequently returned the castle of Cadaqués in 1239 for 7,300 s. of Melgueil, ADM Ampurias, leg. 33, no. 4625 [31 i 1239]. On Ser Carroç, see now J. Soldevila, *Les quatres grans cròniques. 1. Llibre dels feits del rei en Jaume*, rev. ed. J. Bruguera and M. T. Ferrer i Mallol (Barcelona, 2008), p. 140, n. 502.

tently outweighs big and rare.[46] Coastal trade was clearly on the rise before Jaume's reign, but in Barcelona, which we know best, and by all indications elsewhere, before the thirteenth century the most prominent members of the city profited from this trade indirectly, either as wholesalers, rentiers, or administrators of urban markets and utilities. As the financial and contractual infrastructure for trade became fundamentally transformed through the increased use of comanda contracts, commercial societies, and banks, growing pools of capital allowed for what some have called directed trade, the highest level of commerce involving expensive, high-prestige goods and demanding clear contractual outlines. This most privileged sector of exchange has left a substantial documentation, even in the thirteenth century, yet the coastal trade, far more diffuse and less highly capitalized for individual voyages, leaves only faint traces in the sources. Both existed simultaneously and both prospered, even though traditionally historians have stressed almost exclusively this highest level of exchange because it has generated the most records, particularly those that survive on parchment in Barcelona.

The thirteenth century famously witnessed the emergence of the sedentary merchant, capable of directing commercial investments through increasingly complex contractual instruments to distant markets while guarding his interests at home and participating actively in his local community. The evolution and diffusion of more complex legal instruments marked a significant shift in the nature of commercial transactions during Jaume I's reign. While Catalan merchants and investors certainly were not the first to make use of the principal contractual forms of commercial exchange that they employed with growing regularity and agility, they quickly adopted them to their own needs from the Italians and Occitans, whom they encountered in their affairs at home and abroad. The commercial comanda, already documented in an evolving form at Tarragona in 1191,[47] linked for a single venture a sedentary investor with the labor of a traveling partner, who usually received one-fourth of the profits but bore none of the financial risk. Commercial societies, already found in Barcelona in 1184, combined labor and capital in varying degrees from the partners over time, with partners sharing the risk and profit in proportion to their investments.[48] Both forms spread throughout Catalonia by the mid-thirteenth century. The sea loan, in which the investor at home bore all the financial risk of shipwreck and piracy for a set fee, was also in use but made slow headway in the face of the two other contractual competitors.[49] Comanda contracts, short-term, clearly structured, and highly individualistic, offered sturdy legal support for the surge of long-distance trade as Catalan merchants expanded into Mediterranean-wide markets, for they allowed investors and traveling merchants both small and large to form pools of commercial capital quickly and manage risk efficiently. While the basic form of the comanda remained recognizable, it did become more elaborate in the course of the thirteenth century. The addition of other terms to the basic comanda contract is particularly evident in Barcelona, whose commercial documents have attracted the most attention. By the 1260s, commercial and banking societies began to invest their funds in numerous comanda contracts and thereby both diversified risk and deployed large amounts of capital in different directions simultane-

46. P. Horden and N. Purcell, *The corrupting sea: A study of Mediterranean history* (Oxford, 2000), pp. 143-52, 365-66.

47. A. Altisent, "Comerç marítim i capitalisme incipient. Episodis de la vida econòmica d'un matrimoni tarragoní (1191-1203)", *Miscel·lània històrica catalana* (Poblet, 1970), pp. 161-80.

48. Supra, note 12.

49. For Barcelona, see the extensive introductions to *Comandas comerciales barcelonesas de la baja edad media*, ed. J. M. Madurell Marimon and A. Garcia i Sanz (Barcelona, 1973); *Societats mercantils medievals a Barcelona*, ed. A. Garcia i Sanz and J. M. Madurell i Marimon (Barcelona, 1986), 2 vols.; *Assegurances i canvis marítims*, 2 vols.

ously.[50] The evolving legal structure of commercial contracts and their use in smaller Catalan towns has yet to receive comparably close study, but the economic weight of Barcelona clearly made its business techniques familiar to merchants throughout the region.

As long-distance trade expanded during Jaume's reign, so too did the demand for money to promote it. A limited money supply proved a consistent constraint on medieval commercial economies, which turned to credit to cope with deficiencies in available specie. While lending had become common in town and countryside alike in the previous two centuries, the growing volume of trade and investment created new challenges for merchants and entrepreneurs. The rise of banks and merchant-bankers offered a partial solution to the limitations of the money supply by the mid-thirteenth century. Research over the past generation has completely dispelled the old notion that Jews provided the bulk of credit in medieval Catalonia because of ecclesiastical prohibitions against Christian usury. Through pledging of revenue-producing property, seemingly gratuitous transfers, and simple deception, Christians developed multiple forms to extend loans for profit. The increasing demands of a commercial economy, however, placed stress on older, less liquid forms of credit. New strategies emerged to compensate, particularly banking societies. It is now generally accepted that medieval banking owed its origins not to moneylenders or pawnbrokers but to moneychangers. Several *cambiatores* appear sporadically before 1200, and not only in Barcelona, but their direct role in commercial investment remains uncertain.[51] At first, most seem to have had relatively limited direct commercial involvement and do not appear regularly in the surviving sources. Their function would, however, change dramatically toward the middle of Jaume's reign. In Barcelona, twenty-one *cambiatores* are mentioned among the urban magistrates from 1249 to 1270, and many actively invested in trade. Rather than operate independently, prominent bankers began to pool far larger sums of capital in commercial societies for banking and trade, professions that became increasingly difficult to distinguish. Thus, in 1271 Bernat Sesfonts invested the substantial sum of 1,475 lbs. of Barcelona with his associate Jaume Ferran "due to our table for moneychanging and other items."[52] Both individuals also figure prominently elsewhere as commercial investors. The merchant-banking societies of Catalonia, however, still did not employ resident agents in foreign trading centers nor had their accounting practices as yet evolved as much as the great banking societies of the Northern Italian towns. On a more modest scale, Arnau de Codalet, the most thoroughly documented Catalan entrepreneur of the thirteenth century, illuminates the interface between commercial investment and banking. A citizen of Perpinyà who began his activities late in Jaume's reign, Arnau received numerous money deposits, some in the form of a comanda contract, nominally setting the profit of the investor at three-fourths, and yet others as a deposit to be paid on demand. Although not a *cambiator*, this prosperous but unexceptional entrepreneur in fact practiced, as Emery noted, a primitive form of deposit banking.[53] Whether in the modest investments of Arnau de Codalet or in the ambitious activities of Bernat Sesfonts, during the closing decades of Jaume's reign larger pools of capital were beginning to form in order to support the increasing volume of commercial transactions.

50. *Comandas comerciales,* pp. 83-85, nos. 18, 25, 26, 29, 31.

51. For references to early banking in Catalonia, see M. Riu, "Banking and society in late medieval and early modern Aragon", in *The dawn of modern banking* (New Haven and London, 1979), pp. 135-40; S. P. Bensch, "La primera crisis bancaria de Barcelona", *Anuario de Estudios Medievales*, 19 (1989), pp. 311-28; J. Lladonosa, *Història de Lleida* (Tàrrega, 1972-74), I, pp. 276, 329.

52. ACB 1-6-108: "ratione tabule nostre campsorie et aliarum rerum".

53. Emery, *Jews of Perpignan*, pp. 119-23.

The growing interface between commercial and banking functions would also affect the nature of Jewish lending in Catalonia. Before Jaume's reign, Jews did not play a prominent role in money lending.[54] During the thirteenth century, however, as Jewish *aljames* attracted immigrants from al-Andalus and France, Jews became deeply involved in credit operations in Catalan towns large and small. Many families within the Jewish *aljames* became engaged in lending, which focused on relatively small, short-term loans to a broad segment of the rural and urban population.[55] Jaume I took care in regulating the rates of both Jewish and Christian credit from early in his reign, perhaps as much to reassure Jewish lenders of their right to receive profit from lending as to curb excessive interest rates. Yet one can detect a difference in approach between the older communities in Barcelona and Girona, where Jewish participation in the loan market led to the consolidation of the bulk of lending activities in the hands of a few dominant families, such as the Adret, de Torre, and Cap of Barcelona, and smaller, recently established *aljames*. The increasing professionalization of lending among ascendant families in older communities may well have driven more modest Jewish lenders from the saturated credit markets in the large towns to look for new customers in smaller settlements.[56] The increasing involvement of Jews in small-scale lending would affect the commercial sector, but in rather different ways than once imagined. Beginning in the 1250s, Jewish loans make up a far greater proportion of the total surviving credit records in Barcelona, but the loans recorded on parchment, surely redacted for wealthier clients who could afford such written securities, were not necessarily used for direct inversion in commercial operations. With a very high proportion of their liquid assets invested in commercial societies and banking ventures, Christian merchants found themselves frequently short of specie. Jewish loans provided short-term liquidity to compensate for the lack of cash reserves. Despite a wide variety of successful investments in commercial comandas, land, and revenue farming, Arnau de Codalet turned to Jewish lenders of Perpinyà on eleven occasions for small, short-term loans, and similar behavior appeared among leading Barcelona families.[57] Jewish lending provided the short-term liquidity to keep prominent merchants fully invested in their commercial affairs.

Direct involvement of Jews in long-distance commerce is very poorly documented in the Latin sources. Owing to continued interchange with coreligionists in other parts of the Mediterranean and the need for the exchange of coinage, a faint tracery of later commercial circuits, Jewish moneychangers do appear in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, but in this instance the early connection to currency exchange did not lead to direct financing of expanding Christian trade. At least in terms of direct commercial partnership between Jews and Christians, there is very scanty evidence, although Azday Salamon, a Jew of Barcelona, did invest in one surviving comanda contract with Ramon de Banyeres, with whom he had established a network of trust through numerous loans.[58] Within the *aljama* itself, however, Jews would not normally have had recourse to Christian notaries for their business affairs with coreligionists and may well have preferred informal means of association to co-

54. E. Klein, *Jews, Christian society, and royal power in medieval Barcelona* (Ann Arbor, 2006), pp. 58-59; Bensch, "Primera crisis", pp. 314-15

55. Emery, *Jews of Perpignan*, pp. 26-66, provides a point of departure for later studies.

56. Klein, *Jews, Christian society, and royal power*, pp. 164-73. Stephen P. Bensch, "La projecció regional del call de Girona al segle tretze: una visió des d'Amer i Castelló d'Empúries", in *Temps i espais de la Girona jueva* (Girona, 2011), pp. 231-242. For a similar, but slightly later, trend at Puigcerdà, see C. Denjean, *Juifs et chrétiens. De Perpignan à Puigcerdà XIII^e-XIV^e siècles* (Canet, 2004), pp. 87-97.

57. Emery, *Jews of Perpignan*, pp. 124-25; Bensch, *Barcelona*, pp. 285-86 [trad. cat. p. 261].

58. ACB 1-6-2972; Klein, *Jews, Christian society, and royal power*, pp. 175, 186.

mandas.[59] One catches a rare glimpse of the cooperative potential of Jewish merchants from different *aljames* in a commercial comanda concluded in 1273 at Perpinyà, in which Vives Septim, a Jew of Barcelona, agreed to receive 38 lbs. 3 s. of Narbonne cloth from Salamon Sullam de Porta, a local Jew of Perpinyà.[60] One suspects this was merely the tip of an iceberg. Even though the activities of Jewish merchants leave only the faintest traces, in a modest way the growing role of Jewish credit provided short-term liquidity that buoyed the spectacular and much discussed growth of Catalan commerce into distant Mediterranean markets.

Commercial Expansion and Its Control

The rapidly growing volume of commercial exchange compelled King Jaume to intervene in an increasingly coordinated manner to regulate and profit from the movement of goods, merchants, and ships in his vastly expanded realms. Building upon the administrative initiatives of his immediate predecessors, royal vicars, bailiffs, financiers, and accountants sought to clarify rights of customs duties owed the king and barons, who actively promoted the development and surveillance of port facilities and market spaces. Security of trade and customs exemptions became prominent features in relations with foreign princes and towns, and individuals and communities all hoped for advantage from the monarch. Jaume's long reign marks a critical period in a movement from the localized surveillance and exploitation of commerce to the crafting of commercial diplomacy.

The extensive customs lists for Barcelona (1222), Tamarit (1243), Cotlliure (ca. 1249, 1252), Perpinyà (1250), Tortosa (1252), Ribera del Ebro (1252), and Cambrils (1252) provide eloquent testimony to the care with which the king sought to clarify his rights to commercial tolls.[61] Routine, organized exactions on commercial exchange provide a means of tracing not only the movement and intensity of exchange but also of understanding the ability of lords to coerce payments on trade and extend their power over merchants passing through their ports and markets. Ever since the pioneering essays of Frederic C. Lane, economic historians have learned to consider customs duties as far more than a simple extractive rent, depleting commercial profit. The violence that compels merchants to pay customs duties also provides them a benefit: protection.[62] The growing literature spawned by the role of sanctioned violence and (at least potential) protection from bandits, pirates, and economic competitors chiefly concerns the early modern and modern periods, when states are presumed to have exerted violence and extended protection with relative efficiency. This perspective, however, also has advantages for the study of medieval trade, for it helps us understand how rulers came to exert their authority in customs regimes over which local lords also competed for patrimonial control. Too often we have become accustomed to viewing the exaction of commercial tolls as a

59. S. D. Goitein, *A Mediterranean society: The Jewish communities of the Arab world as portrayed in the documents of the Cairo Geniza* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967-88), I, 164-85.

60. Archives Départementales des Pyrénées-Orientales, reg. 4, fol. 39*v* [29 viii 1273]; Emery, *Jews of Perpignan*, pp. 17-18.

61. Gual Camarena, *Vocabulario*, still provides the foundation for the wealth of available material regarding customs.

62. F. C. Lane, "Economic meaning of war and protection", and "Economic consequences of organized violence", repr. in *Venice and History* (Baltimore, 1966), pp. 383-98, 412-28; N. Steensgard, "Violence and the rise of capitalism: Frederic C. Lane's theory of protection and tribute", *Fernand Bruadel center for the study of economics, historical systems, and civilizations. Review*, 2 (1981), pp. 247-73; M. M. Bullard, S. R. Epstein, B. G. Kohl and S. M. Stuard, "Where history and theory meet: Frederic C. Lane on the emergence of capitalism", *Speculum*, 79 (2004), pp. 97-106. For a recent discussion of attempts to rethink customs tolls, H. Purcell, "A view from the customs house", in *Rethinking the Mediterranean*, ed. W. V. Harris (Oxford, 2005), pp. 200-230.

natural, unproblematic expression of princely will in an increasingly well-governed world. Under Jaume, however, the customs lists emerge to clarify uncertainties about royal rights, community privilege, and patrimonial lordship. Thus, the "customs of Tamarit" of 1243 are in fact a judicial sentence to settle "the dispute between the community of citizens of Barcelona, on one side, and *domina* Guillema, widow of Guillem de Claramunt, opposing, on the other"; the "customs of Tortosa" of 1252 were set down on parchment as a result of a request by men of Valencia because of the "many deliberations and much dissension among merchants and those passing with their goods through Tortosa by sea as well as by land."[63] These formidable lists of goods and tolls in fact reveal deeper struggles over lordship and the assertion of royal initiatives to define and assert compulsive force over commerce.

Because of the antiquity of its customs tolls and its central role in Catalan trade, Barcelona provides the clearest example. The well-known customs of Mediona of 1222 represent far more than a long list of taxable items; they attempt to cut a Gordian knot of overlapping claims to profit from Barcelona's rapidly expanding exchange sector. The Carolingians had long ago established a *teloneum*, a toll station to collect a tax on merchandise passing through Barcelona, of which its bishop received one-third. The town formed a terminus at the frontier with Islam for a line of toll stations that rimmed the Carolingian Empire, stretching on its Mediterranean borders from Barcelona to the *telonea* at Les Cluses, Narbonne, Arles, Fos-sur-Mer, and Marseilles.[64] Despite a distant Roman pedigree, royal tolls had assumed many new features by the time of the Carolingians, who nevertheless did go to some lengths to distinguish between market tolls and export/import taxes. During the restructuring of lordship during the eleventh and twelfth century, however, those invested with toll collection, at Barcelona probably the viscount in the later Carolingian era and certainly the comital vicar by the twelfth century, may well have appropriated older elements of customs tolls and combined them with new levies on local market exchange itself as well as on an expanding number of new goods passing through the city. By comparing the customs duties of Mediona with an earlier, twelfth-century tariff list from Barcelona that ennumerated only those items that the count-kings claimed, Pere Ortí Gost has meticulously pulled out the multiple strands of lordship that are knotted together in the partition of 1222.[65] Owing to an important increase in types of imported cloth, spices, and dyes over two or three generations, an unambiguous sign of the surge of Catalan trade, the right to collect fees over long-distance merchandise, the sale of local cereals, meat, and wine, the rental of market stalls, and the use of liquid and dry measures created many opportunities for confusion and accusation. While the king alone claimed tolls over merchants and merchandise arriving directly from the house of Islam, the right known as the *quinta*, most items of long-distance trade were partitioned between Guillem de Mediona and the king; duties on local meats and livestock were shared by Guilllem de Mediona and the bishop of Barcelona; while imposts on naval construction, vessels, arms, olive oil, and a disparate array of other products pertained to Guillem de Mediona alone. Commercial diversification and novel impositions, at times arbitrarily attached to disparate items of exchange rather than specific classes of merchandise, had eroded earlier distinctions between market and export/import duties inherited from the ancient Carolingian *teloneum*.

63. Gual Camarena, *Vocabulario*, pp. 65, 95.

64. On Carolingian tolls, see M. McCormick, *Origins of the European economy: Communications and commerce AD 300-900* (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 640-47, and for the multiple tolls covered by *teloneum*, H. Adam, *Das Zollwesen im Fränkishen Reich und das spätkarolingishe Wirtschaftsleben* (Stuttgart, 1996), pp. 37-68.

65. Ortí Gost, *Renda i fiscalitat*, pp. 397-422.

Even though historians since Capmany have clearly recognized that the partition of 1222 marked a watershed in the fiscal supervision of Barcelona's trade, the context for the partition has aroused surprisingly little comment. A renegotiation of lordship under the demands of financial pressure brought forth this monument in Catalan commercial history. The young king, only thirteen years old in early 1222, was still under the supervision of his baronial counselors and the Templars, who tried to set his finances in order owing to the heavy indebtedness he had inherited after his father's disastrous campaign in Occitania. This was not a propitious moment for a bold, independent assertion of royal prerogatives to sort out disputed claims with an influential noble. During the previous decade, however, Guillem de Mediona, a noble and heir of a prominent early vicar of Barcelona, had became embroiled in a struggle to control and develop a substantial strip of coastal land below the walls known as the Vila d'Alfou, a key to future commercial development of the city. His rival was Guillem Durfort, the principal accountant-financier of Jaume's father.[66] In order to make his claims effective, in 1218 Guillem de Mediona, who had himself extended money to the king, and his wife Saurina granted the substantial seashore tract in fief to two prominent men of Barcelona, the brothers Bernat and Guillem Ermengaud, together with a share of taxes on wine sold by circulating vendors (*crida*) or in amphora and the transport of livestock to the city from throughout the Pla de Barcelona.[67] Pere Durfort, Guillem Durfort's son and heir, finally reached an accord over the valuable coastal strip a little more than a year before the drafting of the customs of Mediona, which contain a substantial section defining the rights that Guillem de Mediona held to commercial tables and rents in this zone. In addition to the tensions produced between two important notables and royal financiers vying to develop the expanding commercial zone of the city's shoreline, the young king and his tutors were also struggling to repay debts, in part through a series of recoinages. Only weeks after the partition of the commercial tolls, the king decreed the recoinage of the *doblench*, which was to replace the older quaternal issue of Barcelona, with the unusual pronouncement setting an equivalence blatantly favoring debtors.[68] Monetary manipulation, surely a central concern for the lucrative commercial tolls, together with competition among influential financier-administrators, eager to gain title to the ascending commercial quarter on the shore, demanded a clear definition of rights between the king and the distant heir of the man to whom his predecessors had delegated their authority. Once the dense intersection of long-distance commerce, local exchange, and rents on shops had been sorted out, the customs of Mediona provided a firm foundation for the king to intensify and oversee his exploitation of exchange, particularly long-distance commerce. In contrast, Guilllem de Mediona's lordship over local transactions fragmented into many hands over the course of the following decades.[69]

Barcelona, however, was not unique. King Jaume also intervened in other ports to clarify his rights over customs duties, contest encroachments, and profit from a growing list of new merchandise. Too often tax morphology has remained restricted to monographs of individual towns. Transformations similar to those in Barcelona occurred in smaller Catalan ports during the first half of the

66. S. P. Bensch, *Barcelona*, pp. 218-19 [trad. cat. pp. 198-99].

67. Arxiu del Regne de Mallorca [ARM], Marqués de la Torre, secció Rocabertí-Boixadors, perg. no. CCCL.

68. T. N. Bisson, "Coinages of Barcelona", in *Studies in numismatic method presented to Philip Grierson*, eds. C. N. L. Brook, I. Stewart, J. G. Pollard and T. R. Volk (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 193-205 [repr. in *Medieval France and her neighbors* (London and Ronceverte, 1989), pp. 345-56]; P. Grierson, "Notes sobre les primeres amonedacions reials a Barcelona: els termes 'Bruneti,' 'Bossonaya' i el *Chronicon Barcinonensi*", in *[I^o] Symposium Numismático de Barcelona (27 y 28 de febrero 1979)* (Barcelona, 1979), pp. 278-87.

69. Ortí Gost, *Renda i fiscalitat,* pp. 468-76.

thirteenth century. Commercial tolls (*lleuda*) and transit fees (*passaticum*) became increasingly contested among the king, local notables, and administrators all along the coast as long-distance exchange and the interface among the three commercial zones of Catalonia intensified. The customs of Mediona certainly dominated the central zone of the Catalan coast between Tarragona and Sant Feliu de Guíxols, for the smaller ports in the Penedès and Maresme, such as Mataró, Sitges, and Blanes, showed little evidence of commercial activity because of the shallow coastline and the lack of a natural harbor. Sant Feliu de Guíxols, on the other hand, Girona's outlet to the sea, was already assuming the outline of a growing port in the twelfth century. Indeed, already in the pact of 1127 with Genoa the count of Barcelona allowed Ligurian ships passing between Nice and the mouth of the Ebro on voyages to al-Andalus to pay a tax of ten gold morabetins either at Barcelona or at Sant Feliu de Guíxols, by then a familiar port of call along the costal route south.[70] The royal *quinta* on merchants originating in al-Andalus was also collected there according to a grant given the abbot of the monastery of Sant Feliu for its transfer to a more defensible site in 1203, even though the move in fact did not occur.[71] Royal control over these revenues seemed secure because of the close connection of the monarchy to the monastery of Sant Feliu. In 1232 King Jaume nominated its abbot, Bernat, to serve as the first bishop of Mallorca after its conquest. Soon thereafter the bishop designate subscribed to the royal privilege exempting the people of Girona from commercial tolls in Majorca.[72] Because the monastery itself actively wished to develop the potential of the port, Abbot Bernat in 1238 limited his commerce in salt and wine in favor of the inhabitants of Sant Feliu de Guíxols and those residing in the adjacent settlement of Sant Amant; Bernat's successor, Abbot Gerart, went further in 1258 by assigning land for the development of its shipyard, an important site, according to Muntaner, for the construction of ships used by King Pere the Great in the war of the Sicilian Vespers.[73] Although the substantial destruction caused by the French invasion in 1285 compromised the early potential of the port of Sant Feliu de Guíxols, the close, confident connection between the monastery and King Jaume made it a secure outpost of royal supervision.

The consolidation of royal control in the small ports to the north, in the Empordà and Rosselló, proved far more problematic. Most of the coast north of Sant Feliu de Guíxols lay in the counties of Empúries and Rosselló, the region of the earliest Carolingian conquests that had for centuries been ruled by closely related comital dynasties as old and prestigious as that of the counts of Barcelona. The county of Rosselló would become attached to the aggrandizing count-kings under Alfons I in 1172, while the county of Empúries retained its de facto independence from the king until the early fourteenth century. Although the county was sprinkled with deep inlets around the rocky Cap de Creus and contained the ancient *civitas* of Empúries and the settlement at Roses, both locations of Carolingian mints, the patterns of earlier coastal exchange from late antiquity appear to have been completely disrupted due to piracy and the general reduction of trade. The ancient Greek site of Empúries was abandoned and never recovered a significant maritime role, while Roses, where settle-

70. *Tractats i negociacions diplomàtiques de Catalunya i de la Corona catalanoaragonesa a l'edat mitjana*, eds. M. T. Ferrer i Mallol *et al.* (Barcelona, 2009-), I:1, no. 43.

71. E. Grahit, *Memorias y noticias para la historia de la villa de San Feliu de Guíxols* (Girona, 1874), p. 218, noted in J. M. Font Rius, *Cartas de población y franquicia de Cataluña* (Barcelona, 1969), I:1, p. 604: "quinta barcharum sicut ego et antecessores mei consuevimus accipere in nauibus mercatorum que de Hispania cum mercibus ueniunt."

72. *Llibre Verd de la ciutat de Girona (1144-1533)*, ed. C. Guilleré (Barcelona, 2000), no. 5.

73. For a summary of these events, see S. Ovietani Busch, *Medieval Mediterranean ports: The Catalan and Tuscan coasts, 1100-1235* (Leiden, Boston, and Cologne: 2001), pp. 93-97.

ment spread out along its beach rather than being concentrated in a *vila*, became the maritime outlet for the new comital center, Castelló d'Empúries. The inland route passing through the Pyrenees at La Jonquera provided the surest access from Occitania to eastern Iberia for merchants, but the early Carolingian *teloneum* at nearby Les Cluses had by the thirteenth century passed under the undisputed control of the viscounts of Rocabertí, vassals of the counts of Empúries. By the early thirteenth century, however, there are clear signs that coastal traffic was intensifying. To tax the steady stream of ships passing through his waters, the count had established a *lleuda* at Cadaqués by 1200, generally described together with the castle overlooking the harbor.[74] Once the customs toll had been set up at Cadaqués, an ideal location to monitor ships as they rounded its rocky promontory before turning south, Cotlliure emerged as a royal toll station competing with that of the counts. Located on the western coast of Rosselló, close to the border with Empúries, the port had become a pet project of Jaume's father. A favored point of transit for Pere I and his wife Maria de Montpellier, this sparsely settled fishing village through royal initiative became the principal port of Perpinyà and Rosselló. In 1207 Cotlliure received from the king an extensive privilege, including the right to hold a market and a fair. At the same time, the king's principal accountant and financier, Guillem Durfort of Barcelona, obtained the castle of Cotlliure in pledge and served as vicar. With substantial financial influence at court, Guillem Durfort sought to develop the port virtually as his own lordship during the final years of Pere and then under the young Jaume. In order to channel the flow of goods from across the Pyrenees to Cotlliure and collect tolls, Guillem Durfort diverted the main overland route through La Jonquera in order to make travelers pass by the castle of Cotlliure; in 1211 the king had to compensate Viscount Gaufred de Rocabertí, heir of the ancient Carolingian *teloneum* at Les Cluses, by assigning him 200 *solidi* of Barcelona annually from the customs of Cotlliure.[75] The traditional dynastic independence of Rosselló made its supervision particularly challenging. Through an exchange with the young king Jaume, Guillem Durfort's daughter and heir ceded her rights at Cotlliure to Count Nunyo Sanç, the king's paternal uncle, who had received the county of Rosselló in King Pere's will.[76] In his own will of 1241, Nunyo Sanç confessed that he had unjustly appropriated a portion of the customs at Cotlliure ever since he had acquired them, for which he offered compensation of 3,500 *solidi* for each of the twenty-five years of abuse.[77] Once the county had reverted to the king, Jaume dedicated substantial resources to develop its castle and port facilities, both at Cotlliure and neighboring Portes-Vendres,[78] yet the customs duties may have proven his most pressing concern. The customs list of 1249 brought to fruition the transformation his father had set in motion over forty years earlier through the conscious reshaping of the road network and the development of a toll station to

74. ACG, perg. 571: "et dimito ei Arnaldo [de Faberiis] castrum de Cadacheriis cum omni iure suo et leuda et portis et piscadis." The monastery of Santa Maria de Roses received a grant from duties on ships from the Cap de Creus (below Cadaqués) to the river La Muga from the count between 1137 and 1154 and again in 1180, *El Cartoral de Santa Maria de Roses (segles x-xiii)*, ed. J. M. Marquès i Planagumà (Barcelona, 1986), nos. 3, 5.

75. Bensch, *Barcelona*, pp. 210-212 [trad. cat. pp. 189-191]; Arxiu Històric Municipal de Girona, perg. 22: "assignamus tibi Gaufredo de Rocabertino et tuis in perpetuum per caminum Iuncharie quod mutuauimus et transire facimus per Cauculiberum ducentos solidi Barchinone monete curribilis accipiendos singulis annis in nostris leudis de Caucolibero."

76. ACB 4-82-61, 109.

77. B. Alart, *Privilèges et titres relatifs aux franchises, institutions et propriétés communales de Roussillon et de Cerdagne depuis le xi^e siècle jusqu'à l'an 1660* (Perpignan, 1874), i, pp. 119-20.

78. In his will of 1272, Jaume I urged his son to use 5,000 s. from the *lleuda* of Cotlliure to improve the port facilities at nearby Portes-Vendres, A. Udina Abelló, *Els testaments dels comtes de Barcelona i dels reis de la Corona d'Aragó de Guifré Borrell a Joan II* (Barcelona, 2001), no. 21.

compete with that of the customs of Cadaqués held by the counts of Empúries. In the old coastal counties of the north, Jaume had to compete with older allegiances and lordships to assert his prerogatives.

The customs of Cotlliure also served as the model for those of Tortosa issued in 1252. The commercial and portuary network along the southern stretch of the Catalan coast, from Tarragona to Tortosa, was relatively slow to develop because of the disruptions produced by conquest and settlement. The lack of natural harbors along the broad, open beaches leading to the mouth of the Ebro did not favor the dominance of a single port-city, and Tarragona failed to reclaim its ancient economic and administrative preeminence in the thirteenth century, even though reference to a *porta fabricata* in twelfth-century documents does point to the retention of at least a portion of the concrete jetties the Romans had built to develop its port facilities.[79] With a growing trade not only along the Ebro itself but also along the reconfigured commercial networks with post-conquest Valencia, the imposition of customs tolls proved particularly contentious and required substantial redefinition during the central decades of Jaume's reign. Both the customs duties of Tortosa and the new version of those of Cotlliure made in the same year came about as the result of a request of the *prohoms* of Valencia for clarification of their obligations. Because of the complex nature of lordship that emerged in an effort to stabilize the frontier, King Jaume intervened resolutely to resolve a complex set of rights and exemptions. Owing to its natural advantage in monitoring passing coastal traffic, Tamarit, the eleventh-century castle located on a hill at the base of small, sparsely settled promontory above Tarragona, offered an advantageous site for control in a threatened frontier zone. Its lordship, however, proved problematic. After recovering the castle from its first lord, Count Ramon Berenguer I of Barcelona enfeoffed the castle with its right to collect coral, fish, and other products to Bernat Amat de Claramunt; by 1108, his grandson, Bernat Amat, viscount of Cardona, had received the right to collect tolls on goods and merchants passing the port and another duty on merchants or ships arriving from al-Andalus (*quinta*) all the way from the mouth of the Ebro to the slowly consolidating frontier above Tarragona.[80] Already in the early twelfth century, the count of Barcelona carefully delineated his right to tax commerce originating in al-Andalus at this frontier castle, a key guard post of coastal traffic. Through a tangled web of enfeoffments and accords between the counts of Barcelona and different branches of the Claramunt/Cardona family over several generations, Guillema, widow of Guillem de Claramunt, eventually inherited the castle and the right to levy tolls, a particularly contentious issue in the years following the conquest of Valencia. The customs of Tamarit in fact represent an accord reached between Guillema and the citizens of Barcelona arranged through the arbitration of King Jaume, who insisted the possession of the tolls and castle depended on his good will.[81] The issue in effect revolved around the geographical extent of trade and, ultimately, the extension of royal authority into the Mediterranean itself. Men of the city of Barcelona claimed they had traditionally paid the toll only on ships and goods as far as Murcia, evidently as far as royal jurisdiction extended due

79. E. Morera y Llauradó, *El Puerto de Tarragona* (Tarragona, 1910), pp. 14-15 notes that in donations of Pere de Icart in 1171, 1198, and 1203 there is mention of a *puerto fabricato*; al-Idrisi also mentions the port in the *medina Tarquna*.

80. *Els pergamins de l'Arxiu Comtal de Barcelona de Ramon Borrell a Ramon Berenguer I*, eds. G. Feliu *et al.* (Barcelona, 1999), II, no. 390; *El liber feudorum maior*, ed. M. Rosell (Barcelona, 1945), I, no. 209: "Et ego, Raimundus comes, dono atque emendo tibi, Bernardo vicecomite, per illut supradictum mobile ipsas leudas de Tamarit per mare et per terram et naufragios de caput de Hebre usque ad honore qui fuit de Arnallo Mironis." On the lordship of Tamarit, see *Castells catalans* (Barcelona, 1967-1979), III, pp. 62-70.

81. Gual Camarena, *Vocabulario*, pp. 65-69.

to conquest by this date, but that Guillema de Claramunt had unjustly taxed their ships going or coming from Andalucia. The king responded by creating broad new categories to determine the legitimacy of the tolls. First, Jaume proclaimed that ships propelled by oars, presumably those involved in local *cabotage*, from Andalucia alone would be subject to the tolls of Tamarit, dedicated principally to agricultural commodities, but not those under sail; second, ships traveling to and from North Africa, the Levant, and Majorca would all have to pay a toll for passage. These terms gave new expression to royal prerogatives over determining the nature of exchange, dependent on whether trade involved the incessant short-distance haulage of foodstuffs, wine, animals, and cloth or Mediterranean-wide exchange. Although the arbitration responded to new conditions along the Iberian coast as a result of the king's peninsular conquests, it also traced out rights on a broad Mediterranean horizon.

Although we are ill informed about the evolution of customs duties in Tortosa and Tarragona after their occupation by Christian armies, it is significant that during the 1240s the king, local lords, and consolidating urban communities began to assert their claims to clarify and fix their obligations. As already noted, an appeal from the *prohoms* of Valencia compelled Jaume I to clarify the status of tolls for merchants passing through Tortosa, yet this is certainly not the only case of urban representatives protesting against what seemed arbitrary, unstable exactions. The citizens of Tarragona also complained about unauthorized exactions levied by Guillema de Claramunt at Tamarit. For forty years, the merchants claimed, they had not paid tolls at Tamarit except on four classes of goods, which included Saracen horses, cotton fabric, pepper and wax. Through an arbitration arranged in 1244 by Guerau de Querol and Pere d'Albalat, archbishop of Tarragona, who himself exacted tolls at the port of Tarragona as lord of the town, the rights of Guillema de Claramunt were limited to sixteen items but explicitly excluded some common goods, again a sign of a distinction between local *cabotage* and long-distance exchange.[82] Another revealing dispute in 1247 involved complaints from the citizens of Tortosa and the collectors of the customs of Mediona at Barcelona, namely Pere, the bishop of Barcelona, and Berenguer Girart, who had jointly purchased a fourth of the tolls.[83] The community of Tortosa (*universitas habitatorum*) dispatched three representatives, Tomàs Gardell, Ramon Homdedeu, and Ramon Tos to assert their claim that the city's inhabitants had long enjoyed an immunity from all customs levied in Barcelona and protested against the actions of the bishop and Berenguer Girart, who sought to impose a tax on wood and other merchandise. Significantly, an accord was reached not through the arbitration of the king, barons, or eminent clergy but through the "pleas and counsel of the community of Barcelona" (*precibus et consilio universitatis Barchinone*), an intervention by the corporation of townsmen just two years before the establishment of the city's municipal regime. The bishop and Berenguer Girart confirmed the immunity of the citizens of Tortosa on the toll they held, but the collectors did insist that the merchants not defraud them by transporting the goods of foreigners as their own, whether carried according to the terms of comanda contracts and commercial societies or simply transported by them on their ships.[84] A yearly oath by the captain

82. On the dispute with the men of Tarragona, Arxiu Històric de Tarragona, Fons de l'Ajuntament de Tarragona, pergs. 200, 201 [13 i 1244], cit. in I. Companys i Farrerons, *Catàleg de la col·lecció de pergamins de l'Ajuntament de Tarragona dipositats a l'Arxiu Històric de Tarragona* (Tarragona, 2009), nos. 29, 30. The archbishop of Tarragona had granted an exemption of tolls on the export of wheat to the inhabitants of the town and the region in 1238 to encourage the development of the port, J. M. Recasens i Comes, *La ciutat de Tarragona* (Barcelona, 1966), ii, p. 139.

83. ARM, Marqués de la Torre, sec. Rocabertí-Boixadors, perg. cccLviii.

84. *Ibid*., "Recipientes pro nobis et uniuersitate Dertuse hanc absolucionem et diffinicionem a uobis domino Petro dei gratia Barchinone episcopi et Berengario Gerardi promitemus uobis pro nobis et pro tota uniuersitate hominum populatorum Dertuse quod omnium lignorum domini uel magistri uel gubernatores uenientes Barchinonam uel transeuntes per

of the ship to the toll collector at Barcelona would ensure compliance. The confusion generated by the increasing complexity of commercial techniques, in which shipping, goods, and merchants of diverse provenance, combining and recombining in a dizzying array of possibilities, clearly played a significant role in the dispute, for the identity of all three elements could prove malleable, particularly under the suspicious eyes of customs officials. As both the complexity of commercial operations and the intensity of exchange increased, sharper definitions emerged in order to fix identities for merchants and their goods and to restrain attempts to impose in what must have seemed in an arbitrary fashion taxes on a growing list of new or unfamiliar items. The impulse to establish clear precedents did not come as the result of an uninvited intervention of the king but evolved in a complex interplay of ancient rights, baronial prerogatives, and an assertion of corporate privilege. By the middle of Jaume's reign, however, these forces had compressed the variety of local usages and exemptions into detailed, regularized lists that allowed royal rights to stand in sharp relief and, through constant probing, create predictable patterns of payment for native and foreign merchants alike.[85]

In addition to supervising the movement of merchants and their goods through customs duties, Jaume I and his counsellors experimented with institutions to supervise foreign merchants in Catalonia itself. The most notable of these endeavors were the *alfòndecs*, buildings that provided in varying degrees lodging for foreign merchants, warehouses for their goods, and sites for monitoring strangers and their business. Because the *alfòndecs* (from the Arabic *funduq*) had a long and complex history in Islamic lands before they were imported as sites of cross-cultural commercial contact in the Latin Mediterranean, their place in New and Old Catalonia differed.[86] They are recorded only in Tortosa and Barcelona. Like other Islamic cities, Tortosa at the time of its seizure possessed numerous *alfòndecs*, here understood as small houses where both Muslim and foreign merchants might lodge. In Islamic lands the *funduq* was often a small, privately owned building, but increasingly in the twelfth and thirteenth century some *funduqs* became associated with groups of Christian merchants distinguished by their nationality. The Genoese had demanded their own *alfòndec* from Ramon Berenguer IV for their help in the capture of Tortosa, and another *alfòndec* was granted to the men of Narbonne on the banks of the Ebro, yet others in the city were leased or held privately.[87] The Islamic tradition of "national" *alfòndecs*, now authorized by royal grants, as well as privately owned *alfòndecs* thus continued at Tortosa after the conquest.

In Barcelona, however, the *alfòndecs* were an innovation. Jaume's father established three blocks of buildings in an attempt to concentrate foreign traders, who had been dispersed throughout the city, along the Ribera district below Santa Maria del Mar. Already in existence by 1203, the royal *alfòndecs* of Barcelona formed the center of the commercial quarter of the Ribera, bustling with new

Barchinonam iurabint semel in anno in posse uestro uel lezdariorum uestrorum quod manifestent uobis uel lezdariis uestris bona fide et absque fraude et machinatione omnes merces quas in lignis magnis uel paruis qua gubernationem gerent defferent siue in comande siue in societate siue pro naulio uel quocumque modo res et merces extraneorum hominum in dictis lignis sint inmisse de quibus hominum extraneorum semper uos et uestri possitis exhigere ius uestrum quod ratione leude habere debetis."

85. At Tamarit, for instance, in a dispute in 1358, the council of Tarragona claimed the toll collectors of Tamarit had arbitrarily imposed additional customs to those acknowledged in 1243, S. F. Rovira y Gómez, *Tamarit* (Altafulla, 1991), pp. 26-27.

86. For a long-term history of the *funduq*, see O. R. Constable, *Housing the stranger in the Mediterranean world: Lodging, trade, and travel in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 2003), esp. 107-233.

87. *Colección de documentos inéditos de la Corona de Aragón*, ed. P. de Bofarull y Mascaró (Barcelona, 1847-1973), IV, no. 56; *Diplomatari de Santa Maria de Poblet*, (Anys 960-1177), ed. A. Altisent (Barcelona, 1993-), no. 560; *Tractats i negociacions*, I:1, nos. 51, 53; *Diplomatari de la catedral de Tortosa (1062-1193)*, ed. A. Virgili (Barcelona, 1997), nos. 164, 303.

construction.[88] The conscious transplantation of an Islamic institution to old Christian territories was not without precedent, however, for local lords had granted similar buildings to Genoese and Pisan merchants in Narbonne, Saint-Gilles, and Montpellier in the twelfth century.[89] Jaume certainly validated this tradition of lordly supervision in Montpellier by pledging to two Genoese ambassadors in 1263 that only the king or his children had the right to demand in pledge, seize, or remove merchandise of any person visiting or residing in the Genoese *alfòndec* in that city.[90] Yet unlike their predecessors in Provence and Languedoc, the *alfòndecs* of Barcelona were not assigned to any national group by means of treaty nor were they associated with any specific group of merchants in the sources. Their foundation was an audacious attempt by Jaume's father to concentrate foreign merchants and their business for royal profit, fiscal control, and the facilitation of commerce. Jaume I, however, soon loosened his control over the area. Early in his reign, he ceded Barcelona's *alfòndecs* to Nunyo Sanç, count of Rosselló, who was also busy developing his customs duties at Cotlliure. After the count's death, the *alfòndecs* reverted to the king, who then leased them to Pere de Llissac; Pere collaborated in their management with Bernat de Parer, a cloth merchant from Saint-Antonin. This early connection of Barcelona's *alfòndecs* to Rosselló and Saint-Antonin is suggestive, for it further emphasizes the fundamental importance of imported cloth from beyond the Pyrenees for expanding Catalan trade in the thirteenth century.[91] Yet the king did not retain direct supervision of the *alfòndecs*, nor did he insist on developing them as closely controlled, national commercial enclaves in Barcelona. In 1258, the royal *alfòndecs* were alienated to a local urban notable, Berenguer de Montcada, in exchange for properties attached to the castle of Altea in Valencia;[92] a vassal of Alfonso X of Castile for his Murcian possessions, Berenguer de Montcada would later grant revenues from the *alfòndecs* to the Dominicans for construction of their convents in Barcelona and Tarragona. Owing to the complexity of claims on the property, the alienation required the consent of the Castilian king.[93] Plots in the area were soon broken off to local entrepreneurs for more intense development. Just as claims to the *alfòndecs* along the Ribera were being resolved according to the terms of Berenguer de Montcada's will in 1268, the king granted permission to Pere Ferran to establish a private *alfòndec* some distance from the coast, near the royal palace, so that Christian, Jewish and Muslim merchants could lodge with security.[94] By the end of his reign, the king seemed more concerned with securing a site for housing foreign merchants, particularly non-Christians, than developing *alfòndecs* for the fiscal supervision of foreign commerce. Because foreign merchants were not required to reside in *alfòndecs*, as was increasingly the case in Islamic lands, the potential utility of the institution as an instrument of royal control gave way to a more relaxed, entrepreneurial mode of housing foreign merchants and their wares.

88. T. N. Bisson, *Fiscal accounts of Catalonia under the early count-kings (1151-1213)* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1984), II, no. 107. On Barcelona's *alfòndecs*, see C. Batlle, "La alhóndiga, centro comercial de Barcelona, durante el siglo XIII", in *Oriente e occidente tra medioevo ed età moderna: Studi in honore di Geo Pistarino* (Genoa, 1997), pp. 61-81; Ortí Gost, *Renda i fiscalitat*, pp. 112-30.

89. Constable, *Housing the stranger*, pp. 311-12.

90. *Documentos de Jaime I de Aragón*, eds. A. Huici Miranda and M. D. Cabanes Pecourt (Zaragoza, 1978-88), V, no. 1342.

91. C. Batlle, "La presenza degli stranieri a Barcellona nei secoli XII e XIII", in *Dentro de la città. Stranieri e realità urbane nell'Europa dei secoli XII-XVI* (Naples, 1989), pp. 99-100.

92. *Diplomatarium of the Crusader kingdom of Valencia. The registered charters of its conqueror, Jaume I, 1257-1276,* ed. R. I. Burns (Princeton, 1985-), II, nos. 195, 200.

93. ACB 4-32-362, 364.

94. ACA, Canc., reg. 15, fol. 107*v* [17 vi 1268].

The *alfòndecs* in the end proved an unsuccessful, transitional experiment. By the fourteenth-century Barcelona's *alfòndecs* were in decline, as were those in Palma and Montpellier.[95] Significantly, however, just as King Jaume was relaxing his grip on the *alfòndecs* in Barcelona's thriving merchant quarter in 1258, local merchants and entrepreneurs asserted a vigorous claim for communal supervision over the Ribera district and formulated a set of brief and fundamental customs for the conduct of business and martime law.[96] The Ordinacions de Ribera provided the prototype for the later Llibre del Consulat de Mar, the maritime law of Barcelona. Control over foreign merchants by the king in his *alfòndecs*, an innovation introduced from Islamic precedent, gave way to the supervision of international maritime commerce on the part of an autonomous community of merchants and investors located at the heart of Barcelona's waterfront district. This fundamental transformation during Jaume's reign would create an enduring institutional structure for Catalan trade.

If we wish to consider the central decades of the thirteenth century as a distinctive period in Catalan commerce, then the end of the basic system that came to fruition under Jaume I came not with the separation of the kingdom of Majorca, which had no immediate impact on commerce, but with the Sicilian Vespers. Catalan merchants had appeared in Sicily from as early as the 1240s, but Angevin hostility disrupted these activities in the 1270s; in partial compensation, Catalan ships began to test the waters of the Byzantine world.[97] The Sicilian conquest not only greatly intensified the trade with the island itself and provided easier access to its valuable, tightly controlled grain exports, but it also offered a platform from which to launch trading ventures to Romania and the Levant. After the Vespers these grander ambitions also deeply affected capital formation: commercial societies involved more investors, banks grew larger, and groups of Catalan financiers became involved in distant markets, such as the Girona entrepreneurs who actively backed Catalan merchants in Sicily.[98] During the closing two decades of the thirteenth century, the Catalan economy was reaching its full potential and, at the same time, confronting new problems in financing and sustaining such far-flung enterprises. In 1300, Barcelona banks faced a series of collapses, which led to the first royal regulation of banking. The pressure to form larger concentrations of capital for commercial investment together with the need for larger ships, including the construction of the large roundships, cogs (*cocae*), for the Eastern Mediterranean, marked the maturity of Catalan commerce around 1300.[99] While the elements of a much wider commercial network could be seen when Jaume I died, these still had not

95. Ortí Gost, *Rendes i fisicalitat*, pp. 122-31; Constable, *Housing the stranger*, p. 189; K. Reyerson, "Patterns of population attraction and mobility: The case of Montpellier, 1293-1348", *Viator*, 10 (1979), p. 278.

96. For the connection between the early Ordinacions de Ribera and the Llibre del Consolat de Mar, see J. M. Font Rius, "La universidad de prohombres de Ribera de Barcelona y sus ordenanzas marítimas (1258)", in *Estudios de Derecho Mercantil en homenaje al professor Antonio Polo* (Madrid, 1981), pp. 199-240 [repr. in *Estudis sobre els drets i institucions locals en la Catalunya medieval* (Barcelona, 1985), pp. 685-712]. Batlle, "Las alhóndigas", p. 77 points to a connection between the *prohoms* de Ribera and the *alfòndecs* but sees their function as a continuation of the mercantile affairs conducted at the site. Because Jaume's father introduced the *alfòndecs*, surely familiar to Catalan and foreign merchants alike, to Barcelona in order to heighten royal control, the assertion of the *prohoms* de Ribera represents a sharp contrast to the original form of supervision of commerce rather than its continuation.

97. S. P. Bensch, "Early Catalan contacts with Byzantium", in *Iberia and the Mediterranean world of the middle ages: Studies in honor of Robert I. Burns*, ed. L. J. Simon (Leiden, New York, Cologne, 1995-96), I, pp. 136-36, 144.

98. D. Abulafia, "Catalan merchants and the Western Mediterranean, 1236-1300: Studies in the notarial acts of Barcelona and Sicily", *Viator*, 16 (1985), pp. 239-40 [repr. in *Italy, Sicily and the Mediterranean, 1100-1400* (London, 1987)].

99. Bensch, "Primera crisis", pp. 321-27 and "Early Catalan contacts", pp. 151-52; Dufourcq, *L'Espagne catalane*, p. 40, note 8.

reached the level of intensity they were to assume after the Vespers. The commercial surge under Jaume was directed primarily toward North Africa, not Sicily and the East, and it was fueled on relatively small, individualized investments rather than on the heavily capitalized commercial and banking societies that were just beginning to form. While Jaume I's reign certainly can be located on an evolutionary institutional framework as Carreras i Candi maintained a century ago, the commercial network taking shape under the conqueror's supervision possessed a distinctive quality and was crucial in integrating the regional potential of Catalan trade in preparation for its expansion into even more distant Mediterranean markets under his heirs.